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universal metered charging to promote 
demand management. Typically these 
models are expected to be more efficient 
than the current model of local authority 
delivery, which results in 67 service 
providers to constituencies ranging in size 
from 1.48 million people (Auckland city) 
to 640 people (Chatham Islands).
Outside these specific proposals, 
the Royal Commission on Auckland 
Governance recommended that water 
services for Auckland be delivered by a 
single, council-controlled organisation, 
putting day-to-day management of 
water services outside the control of 
elected representatives in that city (Royal 
Commission on Auckland Governance, 
2009, pp 567-611). The government’s 
National Infrastructure Plan evaluated 
water infrastructure as the worst 
managed of the five sectors it considered. 
In particular, it evaluated the regulation 
of the sector, investment analysis and 
funding mechanisms as ineffective (New 
Zealand Government, 2011, executive 
summary). The plan did not distinguish 
between urban and rural water services, 
however. It is not clear to what degree 
these problems were perceived as universal 
A number of bodies have advocated reform of urban water 
service delivery in recent times, including removal from 
local authority ownership and control. Water services are 
estimated to have a replacement cost of about $33 billion, 
with annual operating expenditures of $1.7 billion and annual 
capital expenditure of about $1.1 billion (SPM Consultants, 
2009, pp.63-71).
This article describes some of the reform 
proposals that have been made; considers 
what, if any, problems there may be with 
current arrangements for water services 
delivery; develops some criteria against 
which to assess reform options; and 
discusses the strengths and weaknesses 
of different reform options against those 
criteria. Different options have different 
strengths and weaknesses: if reform is 
to occur, decision makers will need to 
consider what their policy priorities are in 
choosing which option to pursue.
Reform proposals
Reform proposals have included those of 
GHD Ltd and PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(2008), the Turnbull Group (2009) and the 
Land and Water Forum (2010). Common 
features of these proposals are the delivery 
of urban water services by corporate 
bodies, with a central regulator and 
Page 42 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 8, Issue 2 – May 2012
or specific to particular sub-sectors of the 
water services industry.
At the same time as New Zealanders 
have been considering these matters, 
the Australian Productivity Commission 
has released a two-volume report on 
its inquiry into Australia’s urban water 
sector (Productivity Commission, 2011). 
Reform advocates, therefore, have many 
alternatives available to them.
What is less clear from the discussions 
to date is what the problem is with the 
present arrangements; or, alternatively, 
what is the opportunity being missed. Also 
missing is an analytical framework which 
allows the strengths and weaknesses of 
different options to be tested. And before 
digging into those issues, it is important 
to define the scope of the services being 
discussed.
Typically, urban water services are 
regarded as three networks: a water 
supply network, a sewage disposal 
network and a stormwater network. In a 
few cases stormwater and sewage disposal 
share a common network. However, 
this is quite rare in New Zealand. From 
a policy perspective it may be better to 
view them as two: an integrated water 
supply and sewage disposal network and 
a separate stormwater disposal network. 
The reason for viewing water supply 
and sewage disposal as one network is 
that almost every appliance from which 
water is supplied to a property is placed 
immediately over a connection to the 
sewer network: e.g. a kitchen sink, a 
dishwasher, a shower. Obviously, some 
water supplied does not make it into the 
sewer network – for example, water used 
for gardening, or, in a business setting, 
water incorporated into a manufactured 
product. However, most water supplied to 
properties is subsequently removed and 
treated through the sewerage network.
Stormwater can be thought of 
separately for two reasons. The first 
is that the water/sewer network is 
used exclusively for services to private 
properties. Stormwater networks are 
used both by private properties and 
also by public properties, especially 
roading networks. The second is that 
demand for stormwater services is 
primarily determined by climate, rather 
than by human activity and decision. 
These characteristics create significant 
differences between stormwater and the 
other networks in terms of policy options 
and issues around demand management 
and regulation. For this reason, the 
remainder of this article limits its 
discussion to options for managing water 
supply and sewage disposal services.
Problem identification
Evidence of problems or significant 
deficiencies in the delivery of these services 
is hard to come by. The major reason for 
this is that these services are currently 
delivered by local authorities, and to date 
no comprehensive national monitoring 
regime has been considered necessary. 
Local authorities are accountable to their 
communities, not to central government, 
and until recently have not been required 
to separately report on these services in 
their planning and reporting documents.
A variety of potential problems can 
be identified. One relates to the cost 
of providing these services to small 
communities, many of which may be 
lacking in wealth. For example, ratepayers 
in the community of Benneydale, in the 
Waitomo District, pay $1,400 per annum 
each for their water supply and a further 
$1,000 each for sewage treatment and 
disposal (rates for other services are on 
top of these charges). This is despite a 
government subsidy of 95% of the capital 
cost of their water supply upgrade. In 
larger communities ratepayers would 
typically pay somewhere between $500 
and $1,000 for these two services in 
total. Given costs of this magnitude, 
it is not surprising that councils are 
cautious before they invest in improving 
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the standard of these services to small 
communities.
Another potential problem lies in the 
possible need to replace ageing pipes. 
Figure 1 shows residential building permit 
data from 1926 to 1974. From 1926 until 
about 1948, residential building permits 
fluctuated between roughly 4,000 and 
6,000 annually. In the post-war period 
there was a steady increase in residential 
building permits through to the mid-
1960s, when they settled at about 16,000–
18,000 annually.
Normally councils do not fund the cost 
of the initial reticulation installed when 
subdivision occurs. This cost falls to the 
developer and is passed on to homebuyers 
in the purchase price of their property. 
The cost passes to the ratepayer when 
the second generation of reticulation is 
installed. Council accounting policies 
typically show useful lives for water 
services reticulation to be from 60 to 
100 years. With 60 years having passed 
since the commencement of the post-war 
increases in house construction, the data 
suggests that councils are now entering a 
period in which they will need to increase 
their expenditure on reticulation renewals 
from previous levels. This cost will be 
most burdensome for communities 
that initially grew after World War Two 
but whose growth has since stabilised 
or declined. In communities that have 
continued to grow there will be a broader 
rating base to support the additional 
expenditure. 
However, there are several features of 
the present system that ensure funding 
will be available for this purpose. They 
include the balanced budget requirement 
of the Local Government Act 2002 and 
the requirement to produce audited 
long-term plans. From 2012 each major 
infrastructure service must be separately 
reported upon, with financial forecasts (in 
a standard format) specific to that service. 
The Secretary for Local Government 
is required to prepare a set of standard 
non-financial performance measures for 
these services also, although these are not 
in force for the 2012 long-term plans.
A third potential problem is that 
demand is being poorly managed. A 
charging model where the amount of 
service consumed has no influence on 
the cost to the user encourages excessive 
use. This in turn will require investment 
in service capacity that is inefficient. 
A simple response to this would be to 
introduce meters for these services. 
Universal metering occurs in Auckland, 
Whangarei, Tauranga and Nelson, as 
well as in other, smaller communities. 
However, proposals to introduce it 
elsewhere usually arouse quite passionate 
opposition. Some is based on a belief that 
this is the first step towards privatising 
water services and some is based upon 
fears for those on low incomes.
Much of this debate is ill-informed, 
because actual analysis of the costs 
and benefits of metering is rare. A 
rigorous study of the benefits of 
demand management techniques was 
conducted by Smith et al. (2010). This 
study examined Tauranga City Council’s 
decision to introduce universal water 
metering in 2002. This deferred the 
development of a new water source for 
the city costing about $70 million in 
2009 values by approximately 15 years. 
The study found benefits with a net 
present value of $53.3 million in 2009 
dollars. The benefits to the council were 
split fairly evenly between capital and 
operating costs, since the deferral also 
resulted in cost savings from items such 
as reduced electricity consumption which 
applied both to water and to wastewater 
treatment (Smith et al., 2010, pp.29-30).
These problems are issues about 
financing and investment. Mäori have a 
quite different perspective. Issues of water 
use and abuse have been a major concern 
to Mäori. Of the first 25 reports issued 
by the Waitangi Tribunal, 11 focused 
specifically on alleged Treaty breaches 
over waterways and harbours. 
A particular issue for Mäori is 
the discharge of sewage effluent into 
water. This is unacceptable to Mäori 
as it debases water spiritually. Mäori 
have a strong preference for land-based 
disposal of wastewater. This problem is 
compounded in coastal areas because 
Päkehä  prefer disposal sites to be away 
from beaches and areas that can be 
used for recreation. Therefore, Päkehä 
tend to favour disposal sites along rocky 
coastlines. However, those coastlines are 
often prolific in shellfish and kaimoana 
and therefore very important to Mäori. 
Taylor comments, ‘the cultural value 
of kaimoana is important because it 
maintains tribal mana and standing’ 
(Taylor, 1984, p.26). With so much Mäori 
land having been alienated, traditional 
rights to coastal fishing grounds are 
particularly important to Mäori.
A more recent articulation of Mäori 
values about water is in the Land and 
Water Forum report. It comments:
We have recognised that the 
relationship between iwi and 
freshwater is founded in whakapapa, 
that freshwater is recognised by iwi as 
a taonga of paramount importance, 
and that kaitiakitanga – the obligation 
of iwi to be responsible for the well-
being of the landscape including water 
and waterways – is intergenerational 
in nature and has been and may be 
expressed and given effect to in many 
different ways. (Land and Water 
Forum 2010, vii)
A respected Mäori leader, Mark 
Solomon, says: ‘Iwi Mäori believe water 
is not only a source of food and physical 
sustenance, but a source of mana and 
spiritual sustenance, being linked to and 
With 60 years having 
passed since the 
commencement of the 
post-war increases in 
house construction, 
the data suggests that 
councils are now entering 
a period in which they 
will need to increase 
their expenditure on 
reticulation renewals 
from previous levels.
Page 44 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 8, Issue 2 – May 2012
reflective of the well-being of Iwi Mäori. 
Water was, and is, also critical to the 
economic survival of iwi, particularly in 
relation to both customary and commercial 
fisheries, papakäinga and housing, as well 
as horticultural and agricultural land use.’ 
He continues, ‘the health and wellbeing 
of water resources, in all their forms, is 
inextricably linked to the health of Iwi 
Mäori.’ Further he comments: ‘How and 
by whom, decisions are made in relation 
to natural resource, including freshwater, 
are pivotal issues for Iwi Mäori as they 
materially affect environmental outcomes, 
and the ability of Iwi and hapu to exercise 
their mana and kaitiakitanga’, and that ‘the 
role of Iwi Mäori as treaty partners must 
be recognised and provided for through 
effective participation and involvement 
at all levels of decision-making over fresh 
water resources: local, regional and central 
government’ (Solomon, 2010, 43, 44).
Any reform of governance arrange-
ments for urban water services has 
potential implications for Mäori which 
may need to be considered in evaluating 
options.
Evaluating reform options
Criteria for evaluating reform options also 
need careful consideration. Promoting 
efficiency is clearly one criterion, although 
what that means needs further exploration. 
The Australian Productivity Commission 
(Productivity Commission, 2011, p.68) has 
identified three components of economic 
efficiency:
• allocative efficiency, achieved where 
resources are used to produce those 
goods and services that provide 
the greatest benefit to consumers 
relative to costs. Benefits in this sense 
include non-financial benefits such as 
environmental benefits;
• productive efficiency, achieved by the 
production of goods and services at 
least cost; and
• dynamic efficiency, achieved by the 
timely introduction of technology 
change to achieve more efficient 
production in the future. Dynamic 
efficiency requires that options 
that create an environment that is 
conducive to ongoing innovation be 
taken into account.
Since allocative efficiency includes 
non-financial values, debates about the 
level of service provided by water services 
can be included under the broad heading 
of allocative efficiency.
However, opponents of reform raise 
equity issues. A frequent theme expressed 
by those opposed to metering, corporate 
forms of water service delivery and the use 
of public–private partnerships (PPPs) is 
that access to water is a right. Any attempt 
to use commercial models for delivering 
water, whether by use of metering of public 
supplies, by using council-controlled 
organisations, or by any of a variety 
of methods of private participation in 
delivery is strongly opposed. Opponents 
perceive such changes as threatening the 
‘right’ of people to an adequate water 
supply (see, for example, Human Rights 
Commission, 2010; Right to Water, 2010). 
Another aspect of this debate arises 
in respect of funding water services to 
small communities. Current funding 
arrangements ensure that whatever costs 
arise in providing water services, they 
are predominantly met at a local level 
through property taxes. This may result 
in charges that are so high that equity 
issues arise. Given the obvious necessity 
of water to life, the concern is legitimate 
and needs to be addressed in any reform 
model.
Finally, the recognition of Mäori values 
and aspirations does not fit comfortably 
within either of these perspectives. They 
fit more readily within a legal perspective, 
since they rest on rights contained within 
the Treaty of Waitangi. Furthermore, 
aspects of Mäori values tend to the 
absolute and do not allow for the type of 
trade-offs that are inherent in concepts of 
efficiency and equity.
A reasonable model for evaluating 
reform options, therefore, would consider 
at least these three criteria of efficiency, 
equity and consistency with Mäori 
values.
Using these criteria, it soon becomes 
evident that different reform options 
have different strengths and weaknesses. 
The following section briefly discusses 
specific reform options and which of 
the evaluation criteria they address. 
Options discussed are metering, PPPs, 
using council-controlled organisations 
to deliver water services, delivery by a 
Crown entity or entities, and possible 
improvements to the present model.
Reform options
Metering
Metering addresses issues of allocative 
efficiency. It has no impact on dynamic 
or productive efficiency but, as discussed 
earlier, raises equity issues. It may indirectly 
address some Mäori concerns about 
the protection of water environments. 
However, it does nothing to give Mäori a 
role in governance decisions about water. 
A critical issue with metering is when 
is the appropriate time to introduce it? 
Metering both requires investment capital 
and creates administrative costs. The 
benefits derived from metering need to 
exceed those costs. This is most likely to 
arise when significant capital investment 
in additional supply or treatment capacity 
can be deferred.
Public–private partnerships
Public–private partnerships come in many 
forms, and it is important to be clear what 
type of partnership is being discussed 
in this context. One type is a concession 
arrangement. This involves a private 
company operating a water service owned 
by a government agency and deriving its 
income from direct charges to customers. 
In New Zealand the former Papakura 
District Council entered into a concession 
arrangement for the supply of water 
A frequent theme 
expressed by those 
opposed to metering, 
corporate forms of water 
service delivery and the 
use of public–private 
partnerships (PPPs) is 
that access to water is a 
right. 
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services in its district. Such arrangements 
are prevalent (but not universal) in France, 
and have been promoted in Third World 
countries as a means of incentivising 
extension of services to unconnected 
properties.
Empirical evidence to support the 
efficacy of concession arrangements is 
notably absent. Chong et al. (2006, p.163) 
tested the price for the supply of 120 
cubic metres of potable water across 3,650 
suppliers in France. After controlling 
for a large number of variables, such as 
population size, level of tourist demand, 
population density, and different source 
water quality requiring different levels 
of treatment, and excluding the effects 
of taxes on price, they concluded that 
concession arrangements resulted in 
higher prices (by about 15% on average), 
and that the difference in prices charged 
was statistically significant. This doesn’t 
necessarily mean that concession 
arrangements are less efficient than public 
supply. However, if they are more efficient 
it highlights an equity issue about how 
difficult it is for public entities to capture 
through their contracts a sufficient share 
of the benefits for consumers.
A different type of PPP is one where a 
private company constructs a facility (in 
water services usually a water treatment 
plant or sewage treatment and disposal 
plant) and operates it for a long period of 
time, usually 20 years or more. Frequently 
the private partner owns and finances the 
plant for the duration of the contract.
Apart from the generalised argument 
that private service providers are more 
motivated to seek efficiency than public 
providers, a particular feature of PPPs 
which should encourage innovation is 
the fact that the model more strongly 
encourages providers to take a ‘whole-
of-life’ costing approach to the design 
and construction of a facility. This 
should lead to greater consideration of 
likely operating costs in the design and 
construction process than traditional 
procurement achieves. As formal PPPs 
are relatively recent innovations, few have 
reached the end of the partnership and 
been handed on to the commissioning 
body for subsequent operation. Thus, 
formal ex post evaluation has not yet 
been possible. 
Since a PPP as described doesn’t involve 
any direct effect on pricing, it appears 
to be neutral in regards to allocative 
efficiency. However, to the degree that 
the output specification freezes today’s 
specification of non-price attributes into 
the future, it inhibits enhancements of 
allocative efficiency that are not reflected 
in pricing: for example, environmental 
outcomes. It does not preclude such 
enhancements, since the outputs can 
be renegotiated. However, if the private 
partner over-charges for enhancements, 
improvements in allocative efficiency will 
be inhibited.
PPPs appear to be neutral in relation 
to equity considerations because they 
don’t affect issues of pricing and access.
To the extent that PPPs freeze 
management arrangements, they inhibit 
any change in management structure 
or practice that evolves to reflect Mäori 
values and aspirations.
Council-controlled organisations
If the concern with present service 
delivery arrangements is that elected 
representatives are not the best group 
of people to make most decisions about 
water services operations, then another 
option is that recommended by the royal 
commission for Auckland: place them in 
council-controlled organisations (CCOs). 
This leaves ownership in public hands 
but puts management into the hands of 
an appointed board. This might reduce 
allocative efficiency, in that trade-offs 
between expenditure on water services 
and other local authority services would be 
inhibited. However, having organisations 
with governing bodies focused exclusively 
on these services might encourage a 
greater focus on productive and dynamic 
efficiency. There is no inherent effect on 
equity in using CCOs to deliver services, 
compared to direct council delivery. 
However, councils could look to include 
suitably qualified people from relevant iwi 
on the boards of these CCOs, which might 
go some way to meeting Mäori aspirations 
to participate in governance decisions on 
water matters.
Crown entities
A further option is to deliver these services 
through a Crown entity or entities. This 
is the model used in Scotland, where a 
Crown entity, Scottish Water, provides 
water services to all of Scotland. However, 
Scottish Water is more heavily regulated 
than a New Zealand Crown entity or state-
owned enterprise is. A separate body, the 
Water Industry Commission for Scotland, 
sets water services prices and monitors 
Scottish Water’s investment programme: 
in effect, it approves Scottish Water’s 
business plan.
A single Crown entity seems to have 
little incentive to enhance productive 
and dynamic efficiency. In Scotland, the 
performance of Scottish Water can be 
readily compared with the performance 
of private water utilities operating in 
England and Wales. This, combined with 
price regulation, provides incentives for 
continuous performance improvement. 
Finding suitable comparators for a 
monopoly water services provider in New 
Zealand would appear to be problematic. 
Furthermore, New Zealand has generally 
preferred a lighter-handed regulatory 
regime than applies to Scottish Water. If 
a single national monopoly were the best 
solution, then this would appear to raise 
similar issues in other utilities sectors. 
For example, would a single national 
electricity lines company be better than 
the present arrangement of a national 
grid operator and local lines companies?
A Crown entity also has problems 
in relation to allocative efficiency. It 
will need to develop a methodology for 
A Crown entity ...  
has problems in  
relation to allocative 
efficiency. It will need  
to develop a methodology 
for determining the 
standard of service  
it will supply to  
small communities.
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determining the standard of service it 
will supply to small communities. If it 
adopts a national pricing structure, this 
will incentivise gaming for investment in 
uneconomic supplies. It will also remove 
the opportunity for local trade-offs to 
be made between the standard of water 
services supplied and other government 
services. However, assuming a Crown 
entity had a preference for charging by 
meter and did not have access to property 
taxes as a charging mechanism, it would 
improve allocative efficiency as metering 
was rolled out.
A Crown entity might better deal 
with equity issues than the current 
model. It would have the incentive to 
introduce nationally consistent policies 
for the treatment of consumers with low 
incomes and/or specific needs for high 
water usage, and these could be reinforced 
through the approval of its statement of 
intent.
A single Crown entity would not 
obviously facilitate Mäori participation 
in governance decisions about water 
usage. This is because Mäori participation 
needs to be at the iwi and hapu level, and 
a single national entity would struggle 
to achieve that. It might, however, have 
the ability to facilitate some outcomes 
that Mäori desire, such as a greater level 
of land-based wastewater disposal, since 
it would have the scale to research and 
develop best practice techniques in this 
area.
An alternative to a single Crown entity 
is to have a number of regionally-based 
entities. Just how many would be needed 
to balance the various considerations 
is difficult to tell. However, a number 
of entities would allow performance 
comparisons to be made, which might 
provide stronger incentives for productive 
and dynamic efficiency. Depending on 
the boundaries chosen, it might also be 
possible to provide iwi with a governance 
role in such entities.
Improving the present model
Rather than simply abandon the present 
model of local authority delivery of 
these services, another option is to make 
improvements to it. Many of the changes 
in water services delivery overseas are in 
response to long-term financial neglect 
by public suppliers, or to existing fiscal 
constraints that prevent responsible 
authorities from investing adequately in 
water services. Ensuring that the present 
system delivers adequate funding for 
investment in water services would then 
make change in New Zealand a matter of 
choice rather than financial necessity.
The present system relies on the 
balanced budget requirement of the 
Local Government Act 2002 and the 
auditing requirement for long-term 
plans, especially the requirement for 
the auditor to report on ‘the quality of 
information and assumptions underlying 
the forecast information provided in the 
plan’ to ensure adequate funding is set 
aside for replacement of infrastructural 
assets when necessary. In this sense the 
approach to infrastructure funding is 
indirect.
The balanced budget requirement 
results in local authorities setting aside 
a sum equal to their depreciation 
expense for capital purposes. However, 
as the auditor-general has previously 
commented, ‘the depreciation charge 
over the life of an asset will equal 
the renewal cost of the asset only by 
chance’ (Auditor-General, 2000, p.21). In 
addition, the present legislation doesn’t 
require the depreciation funding to be 
applied to asset replacement, or even to 
the particular service concerned. There is 
nothing to stop councils using the funds 
to acquire new assets the public desire, 
even if that compromises their long-term 
ability to fund future asset replacement.
Relying on the balanced budget 
requirement and the ODRC (optimised 
depreciated replacement cost) method of 
valuing assets to fund asset replacement 
is obviously substantially better than 
ignoring the issue, but it does not provide 
a complete solution. One possible 
approach would be to require councils 
to prepare forecasts covering a period 
of three or four decades of the funding 
needed for water services asset renewals, 
and to specifically set aside the required 
amount for that purpose. The money 
would be ring-fenced and could not be 
spent for the acquisition of other assets. 
If that approach produced an operating 
deficit, that could be acceptable. This 
approach would distinguish between 
accounting and funding. It would tackle 
funding issues directly, rather than 
relying on accounting methods to achieve 
outcomes they are not designed for.
Allied to this approach could be a 
formalisation of the requirement to 
produce and publish asset management 
plans. At present their statutory 
foundation is tenuous, lying only in the 
auditor-general’s interpretation of the 
reporting requirements for long-term 
plans. Any dilution of the long-term 
planning requirement could undermine 
the asset management planning process 
in local government.
To summarise, the present financial 
management system has considerable 
strengths and has ensured significant 
funding for investment in water services 
since it was introduced. However, it does 
take an indirect approach to ensuring 
adequate investment in local government 
infrastructure, including water services, 
and a more direct approach may be better 
still.
While local authorities are not 
direct competitors and therefore have 
no incentive to hide information from 
each other, they also have no particular 
incentive to collaborate. Indeed, where 
parochialism is strong, co-operation can 
... councils tend to 
introduce metering as a 
last resort when supply 
is extremely constrained. 
However, as the earlier 
discussion showed, 
metering not only defers 
capital investment, it 
lowers operating costs 
for both water and 
sewage treatment.
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be shunned for fear that it is a signal that 
adjoining councils should amalgamate. 
Given that the most effective way to 
improve allocative efficiency is water 
metering, the industry could develop 
tools to help councils evaluate when 
introducing metering is cost-beneficial. At 
the moment, councils tend to introduce 
metering as a last resort when supply 
is extremely constrained. However, as 
the earlier discussion showed, metering 
not only defers capital investment, it 
lowers operating costs for both water 
and sewage treatment. Evaluation of 
the benefits of metering is therefore 
more complex than simply a decision 
about capital investment. At the same 
time, if the industry wants to overcome 
objections to metering, it could also 
develop tools for social impact analysis 
of metering and best practice guidance 
around rate remission and other social 
assistance policies to go with metering 
decisions. These might counter the fears 
of some metering opponents and make its 
introduction more politically acceptable.
There are several actions the local 
government sector could advance 
to improve productive efficiency in 
water services delivery. A key issue is 
determining the optimal time at which 
reticulation should be replaced. As pipes 
age, the quality of service will deteriorate, 
but knowing when it is more efficient to 
replace a pipeline than repair it is not 
obvious. The true cost of either option 
needs to include the costs to consumers 
of planned and unplanned interruptions, 
also. Economic analysis of that kind is not 
routinely undertaken by local authorities, 
yet there is no obvious incentive for the 
private sector to carry out this research 
since it is unlikely to generate a product 
with a large market potential.
The second action is to explore 
collective purchasing options. This might 
be especially useful in the purchase of 
treatment plant equipment, which will 
typically involve imported equipment 
produced in small production runs. This 
would involve the sector sharing investment 
plans and co-ordinating approaches to that. 
It is noteworthy that central government is 
rediscovering centralised purchasing after 
largely abandoning it in the reforms of the 
1980s.
The third is to examine the potential 
of shared services for delivering water 
services to small communities. Local 
authorities are gradually developing 
shared services approaches throughout 
New Zealand, although on a somewhat 
ad hoc basis. Shared service models could 
achieve productive efficiencies without 
trading off the allocative efficiency 
inherent in local decision making.
A fourth potential area for improving 
productive efficiency would be to develop 
techniques for evaluating whole-of-life 
costing in treatment plant investment. It 
seems absurd to resort to PPPs as the only 
effective way of linking treatment plant 
design and operating cost considerations.
Conclusion
To conclude, there are a variety of ways 
in which water services delivery could 
be reformed or improved. Different 
options have different strengths and 
weaknesses. A key issue is whether 
perceived shortcomings in the present 
service delivery arrangements are of such 
significance that substantial reform is 
warranted. The reporting arrangements 
that have prevailed to date make this 
difficult to assess. Changes in those 
reporting arrangements which will 
commence with the 2012 local authority 
long-term plans may go some way to 
improving reporting on these services.
References
Auditor-General (2000), Second Report for 2000, Wellington: Office of 
the Auditor-General
Chong, E., F. Huet, S. Saussier and F. Steiner (2006) ‘Public–private 
partnerships and prices: evidence from water distribution in France’, 
Review of Industrial Organisation, 29 (1), pp.149-69
GHD Ltd & PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008), National Water Industry: 
2008 report card and roadmap, Wellington: New Zealand Council for 
Infrastructure Development
Human Rights Commission (2010) Submission to the Local Government 
and Environment Committee on the Local Government Act 2002 
Amendment Bill, http://www.parliament.nz/NR/rdonlyres/2CAD5C34-
A23A-4EE6-92D8-AE24DE124547/158223/49SCLGE_
EVI_00DBHOH_BILL9872_1_A64493_HumanRightsC.pdf, accessed 
9 October 2010
Land and Water Forum (2010), Report of the Land and Water Forum: a 
fresh start for freshwater, http://www.landandwater.org.nz/, accessed 
28 September 2010
New Zealand Government (2010), National Infrastructure Plan, 
Wellington: The Treasury, http://www.infrastructure.govt.nz/plan/
mar2010/nip-mar10.pdf, accessed 29 August 2010
Productivity Commission (2011), Australia’s Urban Water Sector, http://
www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/urban-water/report, accessed 2 March 
2012
Right to Water (2010), Submission to the Local Government and 
Environment Committee on the Local Government Act 2002 
Amendment Bill, http://www.parliament.nz/NR/rdonlyres/28FA86ED-
DA51-4758-98B3-0BD36E1DAB6E/149361/49SCLGE_
EVI_00DBHOH_BILL9872_1_A55997_RighttoWater.pdf, accessed 9 
October 2010
Royal Commission on Auckland Governance (2009), Report of the 
Commission, Auckland
Smith, N., G. McDonald and D. Wilson (2010) Water Demand 
Management: an economic framework to value with case study 
application, report WA7090/7, Beacon Pathway Ltd, http://
www.beaconpathway.co.nz/further-research/article/reports_and_
presentations_water, accessed 5 July 2010
Solomon, M. (2010) ‘Mana Waimäori: water and cultural issues’, Water, 
167, pp.43-5
SPM Consultants (2009) Information on Local Government Water 
Network Infrastructure, local government information series 2009/18, 
Wellington: Department of Internal Affairs
Taylor, A. (1984) ‘Think big projects in Taranaki: a Taranaki tribal view’, 
in E. Douglas (ed.), Waiora, Waimäori, Waikino, Waimate, Waitai: 
Mäori perceptions of water and the environment, occasional paper 
27, Hamilton: Centre for Mäori Studies and Research, University of 
Waikato 
Turnbull Group (2009) Governance of Water, http://www.waternz.org.nz/
documents/comment_and_submissions/090730_governance_of_water.
pdf, accessed 27 May 2010
